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In past two decades, Internet has developed rapidly and has integrated in many aspects 
of human life. Any disruption of connectivity and the overuse of services cause for 
service unavailability to its intended users. The Denial of Service (DoS) attacks are 
becoming more serious in security of Internet. DoS is a harmful attempt in targeting to 
limit or deny availability of service to legitimate users. This kind of attack can be done 
by consuming important resources. The best action is to block the attack traffic at its 
source. There is no easy way to this approach because attacker can spoof the source IP 
address easily.  
 
Traceback models try to locate source of attack regardless of whether the source address 
field in each packet contains false information or not. Intention-driven model, a 
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sampling traceback technique, provides information about the attack flow and able to 
reconstruct the attack path to the source of attack by the aid of Intrusion Detection 
system (IDS). This technique does not have any flow differentiate mechanism. In other 
words, it is unable to differentiate legitimate user and attacker, when both of them 
sending packet via same route to the victim. As a result, providing incorrect information 
and locate false point about the source of attack. 
 
To overcome this weakness, this research aims to increase the generation of more useful 
ICMP traceback packets, which includes attack path information. More useful 
information about the attack flow provided by the routers along the attack path to the 
IDS, can provide higher accuracy to locate the attacker. To achieve such a goal, this 
research improves the Intention-driven ICMP traceback model by filtering normal flow 
in the specific short time and two new algorithms in UDP-based and TCP-based attack 
are applied. As a consequence of filtering of normal flow, the percentage of packets 
belonging to the attack flow will be expanded and the chance of generating ICMP 
traceback messages which contain attack flow information will be increased. 
 
The results show the proposed model used in this research increases the percentage of 
useful ICMP traceback messages in UDP-based attack about 10% and 14% in the TCP-
based attack when compared to the previous work. The proposed model also decreases 
percentage of ineffective generated iTrace packets in both UDP-based and TCP-based 
attack about 10%. 
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Dalam dua dekad yang lalu, Internet telah berkembang dengan pesat bertujuan 
melengkapi pelbagai aspek kehidupan manusia. Sebarang kehilangan sambungan 
rangkaian dan kegunaan yang melampau boleh menyebabkan ianya hilang keupayaan 
untuk memberikan perkhidmatan kepada pengguna yang terlibat. Serangan penafian-
perkhidmatan (DoS) menjadi semakin serius di dalam keselamatan Internet. Serangan 
DoS adalah percubaan gangguan dalam mencapai had sasaran atau menafikan 
perkhidmatan yang boleh diperolehi oleh pengguna yang sah. Serangan jenis ini boleh 
dilakukan dengan menggunakan sumber-sumber yang penting. Tindakan yang terbaik 
ialah dengan menghalang pergerakan serangan pada punca. Tiada cara yang mudah 
untuk pendekatan ini kerana penyerang boleh menipu alamat sumber Protokol Internet 
(IP) dengan mudah. 
 
Model-model jejak semula cuba untuk mengesan punca serangan tanpa memperdulikan 
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samada ruang alamat sumber dalam setiap bingkisan mengandungi maklumat yang salah 
atau tidak. Model Intention-driven adalah satu sampel teknik jejak semula yang 
membekalkan maklumat tentang serangan dan  berupaya untuk membina semula laluan 
serangan kepada punca serangan dengan bantuan IDS. Teknik ini tidak mempunyai 
sebarang perbezaan mekanisma. Dengan kata lain, ia mampu untuk membezakan 
pengguna yang sah dengan penyerang, apabila kedua-dua mereka menghatar bingkisan 
melalui jalan yang sama kepada mangsa. Kesannya akan, memberikan maklumat yang 
salah mengenai punca serangan.   
 
Bagi mengatasi kelemahan ini, objektif kajian ialah untuk menjanakan lebih banyak 
bingkisan jejak semula ICMP yang berguna termasuk maklumat laluan serangan.  Lebih 
banyak maklumat yang berguna mengenai penyerang yang disumbangkan oleh penghala 
sepanjang laluan ke IDS, boleh mengesan penyerang dengan lebih berkesan dan tepat. 
Bagi mencapai matlamat ini, kajian memperbaiki model jejak semula Intention-driven 
ICMP dengan menapis aliran normal dalam masa yang singkat dan menggunakan dua 
algorithm baru untuk serangan terhadap perkhidmatan UDP dan TCP. Akibat daripada 
penapisan aliran normal, peratusan bingkisan yang dimiliki oleh aliran serangan akan 
meningkat dan peluang untuk menjana mesej jejak semula ICMP termasuk maklumat 
aliran serangan juga akan meningkat.         
 
Keputusan ini menunjukkan model yang digunakan dalam kajian ini meningkatkan 
penjanaan mesej jejak semula ICMP yang berguna hampir 10% dalam serangan UDP 
dan 14% dalam serangan TCP berbanding dengan model yang telah sedia ada. Model ini 
juga telah mengurangkan peratusan bagi penghasilan bingkisan iTrace yang tidak 
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berkesan bagi kedua-dua serangan dalam perkhidmatan UDP dan TCP kepada 10%.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In the past two decades, the Internet has developed rapidly and has integrated in many 
aspects of human life. The Internet is a vast array of connected networks situated all 
over the world, easily accessible by individual computer host in a variety of ways. 
Today people use a wide range of sophisticated Internet service application in their daily 
lives such as search engines, online banking, online trading, e-commerce, etc. 
Individuals and organizations worldwide can reach any point on the network without 
regarding to national or geographic boundaries or time of day. As such the widespread 
usage of Internet without a doubt has become a critical part of today‘s life. However, as 
more activities relay heavily on the networked computers and Internet, along with the 
convenience and speed of access to information, come new risks. Among them are the 
risks that valuable information will be lost, stolen or corrupted. Thus securing the 
Internet infrastructure has become the highest concern [18]. 
 
In recent years, Denial of Service (DoS) attacks are becoming more serious in security 
of Internet. DoS is a harmful attempt in targeting to limit or deny availability of service 
to legitimate users. This kind of attack can be done by consuming important resources as 
well as network bandwidth, server memory, disk space, or CPU time and to block access 
from normal users. From December 2005 to January 2006, 1500 separate IP addresses 
became victims of attacks, with some attacks using traffic rates as high as 10 Gbps [29].  
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TCP/IP lacks the security features that make it easy for IP spoofing during DoS attack. 
Traceback technique is suggested in finding the real source of attack and this technique 
is able to reconstruct the attack path, and locate the attacker. Identifying the sources of 
attack packets is the first step in making attackers accountable. In addition, figuring out 
the network path, which the attack traffic follows, can improve the efficacy of defense 
measures, such as packet filtering [29]. 
 
This thesis presents a discussion about the current research in traceback area and 
presents two different techniques in attack source identification in the UDP or TCP DoS 
attack. 
 
1.1 Background and Motivation 
As the Internet grows in size and complexity, its availability to different kind of attacks 
has been increased. Various types of attacks can happen, for example in Buffer over 
flow, attacker takes advantages by inserting his code into a program and then takes 
control of the system and thus the program error causes the buffer to overflow. In 
Malware attacks, an attacker uses malicious software, such as worms, viruses and 
Trojan horses. Attacker aims to put harmful software to create a host of problems, which 
can range from simple problems to even getting accesses to the computer at a later time. 
In Denial of service attack, attacker attempts to stop legitimate users from getting access 
to network resources. It can take place by flooding the network or server with huge 
useless traffic [18].  
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Network security considers three main goals: 1) Confidentiality: ensure data is kept 
private. 2) Integrity: data must be protected from unauthorized modification whether by 
human error or intentional tampering. 3) Availability: guarantee access to data be 
available as needed [18]. DoS attack causes problems in availability of data when it is 
needed. 
 
DoS attack can be listed into two main categories: ordinary and distributed. In the 
ordinary DoS attack class, attacker uses a tool to sends packets to the target system. 
These packets are intended to disable or overwhelm the victim, usually to reboot the 
target. In the Distributed DoS (DDoS), attacks will emerge from many places called 
zombies or agents. DDoS can disable the servers, and block the legitimated users to 
access the resources [7]. 
 
IP spoofing is commonly linked with malicious network activities, such as DoS/DDoS 
attacks [43]. Each IP packet contains two addresses: source and destination. The 
destination address is used by the routing architecture to deliver the packet. The IP 
network routing infrastructure does not verify the authenticity of the source address 
carried in IP packets. In general, no entity is responsible for the correctness of source 
address. The source address is needed by the destination for the message reply [30]. 
DoS/DDoS attacking tools spoof IP addresses by randomizing the 32-bit source-address 
field in the IP header, which hides attacking sources.  
 
An action to identify the real source of attack packets is the traceback method. The 
advantage of this method is the attacker is held accountable for abusing the Internet. In 
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addition it is useful in reducing DoS attacks either by isolating the identified attack 
sources or by filtering attack packets as mentioned in [3]. 
 
In the literature relating to DoS, several traceback techniques are suggested and they are 
still under additional research [5, 6, 33, 44]. One of these methods is ICMP traceback 
model which generates and sends out-band ICMP traceback messages. Generated 
traceback packets include enough information for the victim to use them to rebuild the 
attack path [6]. This method is explained in details in chapter 4.  This research improves   
Intention-driven iTrace model [44] in order to locate the source of attack  as accurate  as 
possible.  
 
1.2 Problem Statement 
Traceback methods have been suggested as a source-spoofed IP packet detection in DoS.  
In the traceback model, partial information about the path is provided to the victim or to 
Intrusion Detection System (IDS). After collecting enough information about the attack 
path, victim can make a reverse chain to the source of attack. ICMP traceback and 
Intention-driven ICMP traceback are two models belonging to traceback methods. 
Intention-Driven iTrace model, an enhanced model of ICMP traceback, can provide 
more ―useful‖ traceback packets to the victim to reconstruct the path compared to 
original ICMP traceback model. 
 
The meaning of ―useful‖ ICMP traceback (called iTrace) is a packet whereby  
information provided is related to the attack path and by providing this information, the 
victim would be able to reconstruct the path to the source [44].  
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When the attack flow and legitimate flow send packets to the same destination (victim), 
generated iTrace and information provided in some routers along the path has a 
significant effect in finding the accurate source. We define this router with an important 
task to provide correct information about attack path labels as critical routers. 
 
However, Intention-driven iTrace model lacks of flow differentiate mechanism cause a 
serious problem. In other words, it is unable to differentiate legitimate user and attacker, 
when both of them sending packet via same route to the victim. This problem makes the 
critical routers provide incorrect information and locate false point about the source of 
attack.  
 
1.3 Research Objective 
The objectives of this thesis are: 
 To propose a new algorithm in UDP-based DoS attack. 
 To propose a new algorithm in TCP-based DoS attack. 
These two new algorithms increase the percentage of useful iTrace packets. These 
packets are generated by the critical routers along the attack path which provide more 
useful information about the accuracy of attack location. 
 
1.4 Research Scope  
This research  focuses on traceback method in DoS in ordinary attack class [7].  Our 
traceback model aims to locate real attacker and not the zombies or agents associated in 
distributed class of DoS attack. DDoS is a distributed model of DoS and proposed  
